1  Thoughts on the Oil Investment Cycle 

 关于原油投资周期的几点思考

We are in the midst of the fourth major oil investment bust since 1900, and while this cycle is different in some critical ways (particularly the speed at which investment translates into output), the big picture process is the same as in previous cycles. 

我们正处在自1900年以来第四个主要的原油投资热潮的中期。然而这个周期对比其他周期来讲，从不同的角度来看（尤其是在投资转化为输出的这个速率方面），宏观上来说和前投资周期并无二致。

2

Commodity investment cycles tend to  follow a broadly classic process: 

大宗商品的投资周期往往倾向重复一套固定经典的流程

1) In the first phase, a pickup in commodity-intensive growth causes a global surge in demand for commodities to outstrip supply.  As demand pushes up against capacity limits, prices rise.

在第一个投资阶段里，当来自于大宗商品深度的经济增长出现好转，就会导致一个全球对大宗商品的需求出现暴增并进一步使得需求超越供应。当需求激增，最终超越需求限制时，大宗商品的价格上涨。

2) In the second phase, high prices caused by the supply and demand imbalance induce large amounts of capital expenditure.  As prices rise, margins for commodity producers widen and profits increase.  These producers, flush with cash and looking at high prices, invest in profitable opportunities to expand production.  There is a massive investment boom.  This acts as a support to growth and inflation as capital expenditure accelerates.

在第二个阶段里，由供需之间的不平衡关系而引起的高价格将诱发大规模的资本开支。当价格出现普涨，大宗商品的制造商们的生产的安全边际更宽同时利润也攀升。这些生产商们，手上持有着充沛的现金并且紧盯着更高的价格，同时寻找着更具利润的机会去拓展他们的生产规模。而这导致的是一个更大规模的投资热潮。这样的现象同时将给予增长以及通胀一个强力支撑，这也伴随着资本开支的加速上升。

3) The third phase is typically marked by a slowdown in commodity demand that occurs when the original growth that sparked the cycle fades and high prices incentivize reductions in demand growth, by encouraging substitution and efforts to improve efficiency.  Simultaneously, the investment boom begins to bring new supply online, demand/supply imbalances ease, and prices stabilize.  Thus, high prices help set in motion the increase in supply and reduction in demand that eventually lead to the turning of the cycle.

第三阶段通常由一个大宗商品需求的放缓，紧接着就是先前由大宗周期带来的激增逐渐减弱。高昂的大宗商品价格同时进一步遏制了需求的增长。而市场对可替代的大宗商品的渴求以及使用这些可替代物的努力将增强这个系统的效率。与此同时，投资热潮将进一步带来新的供应生产线，需求/供应之间的不平衡将逐渐减弱，价格逐渐平稳。因此，高昂的大宗货品价格将需求的增长和需求的减弱这样的趋势不断加强，最终扭转整个循环。

4) In the fourth phase, there is a supply glut.  The balance between demand and supply swings sharply in the other direction, as production is much greater than demand.  This phase is typically characterized by large price declines. 

在第四个阶段里，我们将看到供应过剩。当产量远大于需求时，供应需求之间的平衡将往另一个方向剧烈地变化。这样的阶段也往往具有价格大量下跌的特性。

5) As prices fall, margins for commodity producers are squeezed.  And, in the fifth phase, producers respond to low prices by slashing investment and in some cases shutting down production permanently.  This decline in supply eventually brings the market back into balance, as the low investment deteriorates capacity, sowing the seeds for the next cycle. 

当大宗商品的价格跌落时，大宗商品生产商们的安全边际被巨大地挤压。同时在第五个阶段里，生产商为了应对大宗商品价格的低迷，将通过大量削减投资并且通过永久关闭部分生产线以应对危机。供应的大幅削减将最终迫使市场回归平衡，而当低迷的投资在效益上不断恶化时，这又为下一轮商品的复苏散播下了种子。

We are currently in stage 5 of the most recent cycle, where years of investment have left the market oversupplied and prices at the lowest level in a decade.  The move in oil prices has resulted, as one would expect, in a collapse in investment that is no longer profitable.  For most of 2016, there will likely continue to be a significant spot oil glut, as the lag between production and investment means that cuts will only gradually bite into production.  However, unless prices rise significantly, supply will likely fall short of demand some time in 2017, leading to one of the most significant shortages in the history of the oil market soon thereafter.  At this point, the forward price of oil does not appear high enough to create the needed investment, and the longer oil prices remain low, the larger the future gap between supply and demand is likely to be.  

我们现在处在第五个阶段，多年的在市场投资过剩而大宗商品的价格在这一阶段处于最低水平。原油价格的走势将导致，可以预期的是，那些不再盈利的投资将就此崩溃。在2016年的大部分时间里，非常可能我们会看到原油现货的显著过剩。生产和投资之间的滞差意味着生产的削减只会逐渐蚕食生产力。无论如何，除非价格显著增长，在2017年的一段时间内，供应非常可能达不到需求的水平，这也将导致原油市场有史以来最显著的短缺情形。在这个节点上，原油远期的价格并未高昂到足以提供足够的投资资金。而原油价格在低位保持越长时间，供应和需求之间的滞差就越可能在未来增加。
 
Before we dig into where we stand in the current oil investment cycle, it is worth offering some perspective on the major oil investment booms and busts over the last 100 years.  The chart below shows the four major oil investment booms since 1900 and the price levels that spurred them.  In the appendix, we describe each of these past booms.  While the details of each cycle are different, the cause and effect linkages that drive them are the same. 

在我们深入了解自身所处的石油投资周期之前，提供部分关于主要石油投资热潮的观点将是大有裨益的。尤其是过去100年里发生主要的原油投资热潮以及泡沫破碎。上图表现了自1900年以来四大主要的原油投资热潮以及触发这些热潮的价格水平。在附录里，我们将具体描述每一个过去的热潮。然而每一个这样的投资周期里，具体的细节都是不同的，然而其中的因果关系还有促使其形成的逻辑联系都是相同的。

The current leg down in the commodity investment cycle (and accompanying decline in prices) has severely impacted the medium-term outlook for oil supply.  While there is lots of uncertainty around exactly how long the market will remain out of balance, a particularly large reduction in supply could leave the market undersupplied as soon as 2017.  In the near term, cuts in shale investment have and will continue to bite into production, and the supply issue is amplified going forward, as massive capex cuts from more traditional producers (with longer lag times between investment and production) flow through to supply.  As described above, the supply glut phase of the cycle sows the seeds for a price rebound, which is necessary to allow supply to catch up with demand.  Below, we walk through our picture of the current supply and demand dynamics in more depth. 

现在大宗商品投资周期里的重挫（连同已经重挫的大宗商品价格）开始剧烈冲击中期里对石油供应的前瞻。当市场里的参与者对市场本身的供需失衡将会持续多久充满着不确定性时，来自供应端的锐减可能为市场带来供应不足的巨大问题。在近期来看（2016年）页岩油投资额度的锐减将最终影响产能，供应问题开始继续放大，来自传统生产商的巨大资本支出（在投资以及生产中伴随着更高的滞差）最终流向供应端。如上面所描述的，供应过剩这一阶段为价格反弹布下了种子，而这对于最终使得供应得以跟上需求是必须的。下文中我们将深入阐述在我们的前瞻里，更深度的供应和需求现状变化。

3

Low Oil Prices Have Led to a Sharp Pullback in Investments 

低油价使得投资额度锐减

At current spot and forward prices, most of the world’s investment opportunities are uneconomical.  Consistent with this picture, over 20% of global oil capex was cut in 2015, and further cuts of at least 15% are likely this year.  If prices remain low, we are likely to see capex collapse even further.

在现在的现货和远期价格，世界上大部分的投资机会都缺乏经济效益。和这个场景一致的是，2015年里，超过20%的全球石油资本支出被削减，而今年（2016年）非常可能有近15%的削减，当价格趋向于低迷，我们将看到资本支出进一步崩溃。

US Shale Production Has Already Turned and Will Continue to Decline in the Coming Year.

美国页岩油产量开始逆转，这样的产量还会继续减少。

So far, US shale is the main source of oil supply where production has already turned, and production is likely to continue to decline over the next year.  US shale production is much more responsive to prices than traditional sources of production—high decline rates mean that practically continuous reinvestment is required to maintain production levels.  The time between initial investment and oil extraction is also significantly shorter for shale, meaning that capex cuts hit production faster in current (and future) cycles than has been the case historically.  The dynamic nature of shale, combined with its relatively high cost of production, makes it particularly vulnerable in today’s price environment. 

迄今为止，美国页岩油是石油供应的主要来源，其生产量增长趋势出现反转，产量将在明年持续减少。美国页岩油远比传统的生产反应更为敏锐。居高不下的下降率意味着持续不断的重复投资对维持当前生产水平是极其必要的。而页岩油的从初始投资到位到石油萃取这中间的耗时是更短的，这意味着资本支出在现在（以及未来）的周期里比历史周期中更能重挫生产量。页岩油的动态特性，结合了其相对来说高昂的生产成本来看，使得它在今日的价格环境里尤为脆弱

As a result, rig counts have plummeted to 2010 levels and production started to decline in the second half of last year, ahead of traditional counterparts.  Declines in shale production thus far have actually been smaller than many expected, in large part because companies have managed to focus on only their most productive wells and to tighten their belts in typical cyclical ways (by firing employees, squeezing service providers, etc.).  However, there are limits to how long companies can fight the tide of falling oil prices with this type of cost cutting.  Additionally, because many of these cost-saving measures are tied to oil prices and associated activity levels, the positive impact of a price increase on shale production is somewhat muted by the fact that these costs would also increase. 

结果是钻机的数量大幅下滑至2010年的数量水平，生产力开始在第二年下半年开始减少，和传统制造业者比较更甚。因此页岩油产量的递减程度较期望的少许多。在更大的方面来看由于这些公司成功地将他们的努力专注在他们所有的，生产力最强的钻井并且将他们在这样的周期里采取紧缩政策（通过解雇员工，将服务提供商的效益榨干等方式)。即便如此，当石油价格骤降，公司抗击通过采取上述这样的成本控制方法抵抗负周期石油的能力是有极限的。进一步说，因为有许多节流控制成本的方法和原油价格以及相关活动水平有极大的关系，即使在石油价格上涨时，这样的正面影响也会被页岩油上升的生产成本所抵消。

Outside of Shale, Production Has Not Yet Turned but Will Likely Decline Meaningfully in the Coming Years 

在页岩油以外，石油生产量仍未复苏然而其将在不久的未来持续减少。

While investment has been cut across all sources of production, non-shale supply has not yet turned, as past investments continue to come online.  Non-OPEC supply outside of the US is set to start declining gradually in the coming months, and we are likely to see a meaningful acceleration in supply declines beyond 2017, as the massive cutback in investment over the past year flows through.  OPEC production has actually increased over the past year, as OPEC stepped away from its role as swing producer and chose instead to produce at nearly full capacity.  The return of Iranian production following the lifting of nuclear sanctions is expected to provide a nearterm boost to production, but OPEC output is otherwise expected to remain flat at high levels over the next few years. 

当在石油的不同生产中投资规模都被削减时，非页岩油的供应仍未复苏，即使在过去的投资持续到位时亦然。在美国市场以外的，非OPEC的供应仍将在未来几个月持续下滑，我们同时可能见到2017年随着供应减少而带来的有意义的石油价格的攀升，而这是由于过去几年来自投资的巨额撤回决定的。OPEC的生产量在过去几年获得持续的增长，当OPEC不在生产调节者并且决定大开马力生产时。伊朗核制裁的升级被市场预期为，短时间里来自原油价格的收益将攀升，然而OPEC 的产量数去却被市场预期为，在未来几年将维稳在高位水平。

  
While Low Oil Prices Have Led to a Bleak Supply Outlook, Demand Is Expected to Grow at a Moderate Pace.

当低油价开始导致供应前景黯淡，市场将预期需求以稳定步伐增长。

Global oil demand will continue to grow at a moderate pace, driven entirely by the EM world, against a backdrop of modest global growth.  While oil demand is driven primary by economic growth—which typically accounts for around three-quarters of the change—it is also affected by the oil price itself.  Demand has received a boost from this cycle’s price decline, which will fade over the coming years. 

全球石油需求将以稳健的步伐增长，在全球适度增长的背景下，而这样的增长率是由发展中世界带来的。当石油的需求首先被经济的增长所驱动，一般是以近三个季度的变化以计算，而这同时也受到油价自身的影响。需求将受到来自周期价格的衰退的强力支撑，而这样的支撑力将在未来几年减弱。
 
From a sector demand perspective, the transportation and petrochemical sectors are likely to account for the majority of demand growth.  The transportation sector, which accounts for 55% of global oil demand, is likely to grow at a modestly slower pace in coming years, as pressure from rising fuel efficiency regulations (such as CAFE standards in the US) is somewhat offset by continued vehicle fleet growth in the EM world.  Feedstock demand from the petrochemical sector is expected to be strong, as past investments in chemical plants come online to meet rising EM demand for plastics.  Oil is also expected to continue to lose market share to renewables and other sources of energy in the power sector, though the impact will be fairly small as little oil is used for power generation at this point. 

从不同板块需求的角度来看，运输以及石油化工板块贡献了绝大部分需求的增长。而运输板块，占了全球原油需求的55%，在未来几年非常可能以一个缓慢而稳健的速率增长。同时也受到了来自石油效率监管的压力（比如说美国的CAFE 标准）而这样的压力被新兴市场中来自运输工具，船舰的增长所冲销。石油化工板块里的进料需求被市场预计为强劲的。来自化工厂房的投资逐渐上线以满足来自发展中市场对塑料的强劲需求。石油被认为将在未来与来自其他能源领域的可替代品以及可再生能源的竞争中失去市场，然而这样的冲击将是非常小的，尤其是如今石油被广泛利用在能源生产的应用的情况下。

 
Below, we highlight some of the dynamics affecting transportation sector demand. 
以下我们将重点强调一些会影响运输需求板块的变量。

4

Rising Fuel Efficiency Standards Will Be a Drag 

更严苛的燃料效率标准将成为石油价格的负担

As environmental concerns mount, governments across the globe have made a big push to increase fuel efficiency, manifesting in lofty standards for carmakers and penalties for non-compliance.  For example, US CAFE standards call for roughly 4% annual efficiency gains in new cars, twice the rate we’ve seen over the past decade.  Other regions, such as China, the EU, and Korea, have set similarly aggressive targets, as shown below. 

随着来自环境的愈发关注，全球各个政府致力于推广更严苛的燃料效率标准，并且给例如汽车制造商这样的厂商制定了傲慢的标准，如果他们不遵守条约的话。举个例子，美国CAFE标准要求4%的年收益作为罚款。而这是过去标准的2倍。在其他地区，比如说中国，欧洲以及韩国，都设立了更具有侵略性的目标，如下图所示。

To illustrate the point, full adherence to CAFE standards in the US would result in a reduction of oil demand by about 0.5 mb/d by 2020.  If other countries follow a similar pattern, the impact has the potential to be meaningful for global demand.  That said, it’s hard to know to what extent companies will actually adhere to standards if consumer preferences are at odds with policy objectives.  The chart on the left below lends some historical perspective to the case at hand.  Past increases in fuel efficiency have been accompanied by large increases in oil prices—in this instance, standards are competing with low fuel prices.  In addition, current CAFE standards call for more sustained and faster improvement than we’ve seen at any point over the past 35 years.  The stated regulations appear to be a high target (and could change in upcoming reviews if the goal winds up being too lofty). 

为了更好地说明我们要讲的观点，完全遵守美国设定的CAFE的标准将会减少原油50万桶/日的需求。如果其他的国家遵从相似的规律，这样的冲击将对全球需求有同样的潜在影响。这么说，我们很难得知这些企业会如何遵守这些标准，如果客户的偏好和政策的目标是相悖的话。左下图让我们得以一窥历史数据。过去在燃料效率方面的提高都是通过油价大量提升而达到的，在这个例子里，标准和低燃料价格进行比较。除此之外，现有的CAFE标准需要一个更为持续以及快速升级的标准，这和我们在过去35年里见到的都截然不同。这一现行的标准似乎是一个非常高的目标（如果目标定的太高，接下来的反馈肯定会发生变化）。

But Rising Vehicle Penetration in Emerging Markets Is Exerting Upward Pressure on Demand.

然而新兴市场的车辆普及率正在上升。

Increasing demand for vehicles from emerging market consumers is likely to somewhat offset the downward pressure from rising efficiency standards.  Most of the demand growth within the transportation sector is likely to come from EM economies, such as China and India, which are seeing growing middle classes.  In particular, these countries are expected to see a rapid increase in vehicle penetration off of very low levels.  The charts below illustrate this dynamic for cars, though it is equally valid for light trucks and heavy vehicles as well.

新兴市场消费者对于汽车的持续增长的需求将进一步冲销来自汽车燃料效率更严苛的行业标准的压力，绝大部分来自于需求的增长，来自于新兴经济体在运输板块上持续攀升的需求，比如说，中国和印度，我们可以看到强劲增长中的中产阶级。尤其是这些国家将被指望一个迅速的，在汽车普及率的增长。下图展示了汽车的变量，尽管这同样适用于轻卡车以及重型运输工具。

5

And the Impact from Fuel Switching Will Be Limited in the Next Few Years 

 来自石油的冲击将在接下来几年受到限制

Disruptive technologies like electric- and natural gas-powered vehicles have the potential to displace a significant amount of oil demand in the longer term, but current economics are unfavorable and logistical bottlenecks stand in the way of near-term mass adoption.  For electric vehicles, the necessary battery technology to incentivize mass adoption is likely at least a few years away.  Additionally, the lag between investment in battery factories and production is sufficiently long (and the current investment level is sufficiently low) to make expectations of mass adoption within the next five years impractical, barring a technological breakthrough in the production process.  In the case of natural gas vehicles, high upfront costs (which are only slowly improving), infrastructure bottlenecks (e.g., fueling stations), and the current limited availability of natural gas/LNG shipping in many regions present major near-term roadblocks. 

 （对石油行业）具有破坏性的科技，例如电力以及天然气混合驱动的运输工具有潜力在长期替代石油的位置。然而当今的经济并不适合大量采用并普及类似技术。对于电动车来说，其必须的电池科技，要达到大量普及的水平，需要好几年的时间。进一步说，来自电池工厂的电池的投资以及产量之间的滞差非常巨大。（现在的投资水平非常的低）要在接下来的五年使得（电动车）的大规模普及变得不切实际，那就要阻拦在此领域的巨大成就。在天然气运输工具里案例中，其前置成本高（这些车型技术升级缓慢）同时伴随着基础设施的固有瓶颈（建立天然气供应站）同时这些运输工具无法在众多区域中使用。

For example, the charts below show a range of possible paths for electric vehicle demand—in even the most bullish scenarios, only 0.2-0.3 mb/d of oil are expected to be displaced over the next five years. 

举例来说，下图展示了一系列可能的，电动车需求的可能路径，即使在最好的情况里，只有20万~30万桶石油/日的耗油会在接下来5年内被取代。
 

Inventories Are Helping to Bridge the Gap, but Limited Cheap Storage Capacity May Be a Downward Pressure on Prices in the Near Term.

石油存货在帮助填补这中间的空缺，然而仅有的便宜的石油可用储量有可能在不久的未来成为石油价格的潜在压力。

Oil supply can be met by demand or stored as inventory.  The price of oil will reflect how these net out.  Inventories today are helping to smooth an oversupplied market, as they move supply from today into the future.  For this mechanism to work, market participants have to be willing and able to buy oil today and pay the costs associated with storing it, because they can sell at a future date for a price where they make a profit.  Over the past year and a half, the steep oil futures curve has incentivized a rapid build in oil inventories. 

石油供应可以满足需求或储存为库存，石油的价格会反映最终的净收益。当（石油生产商）将今日的供应转移到未来，今日的库存将使这个已经供应过剩的市场得以更好的运作。为了让这样的机制不同运作，市场的参与者必须主动并且想要在今天购买原油并且支付其中的储存成本，因为他们能在未来以一个能盈利的价格出售。在过去的一年半里，陡峭的石油期货曲线促使石油库存大量增加。

 
Reported OECD inventories are at record highs, and US commercial storage (especially Cushing) is operating at close to 90% utilization rates.  While it’s difficult to know precisely how close we are to actual capacity limits, there is a risk that this storage capacity fills and oil has to be increasingly stored in more expensive offshore tankers or even shut in, which would be a downward pressure on oil prices and likely require even lower prices than are discounted for the upcoming year .

公布的OECD石油库存达到了纪录新高，美国商业石油储存（尤其是库欣）在接近90%的利用率下运作。虽然很难准确地知道我们与实际能力有多接近，总有个风险是石油库存的容量到达极限，石油库存逐渐被储藏至更为昂贵的境外水箱甚至是到必须销毁库存的阶段，而这将成为石油价格的下行压力，在未来几年，而最终需要更低的石油价格已完成复苏。

库欣是全球交易量最大的原油期货美国WTI原油期货的主要交割地，每周平均有超过30亿桶WTI原油期货合约在此地进行交割。库欣拥有世界最多的储油罐，储存容量达7300万桶，相当于全美总存储量的13%左右。美国几条重要的输油管道在此地汇聚。

Barring a Significant Price Increase, Oil Markets Will Likely Shift to Undersupply by 2017.

通过阻止石油价格的增长，石油市场将可能在2017年转变为供不应求。

Overall, unless prices change, we expect the oil glut to lead to a major shortage starting at some point in 2017.  The following chart shows what we expect for oil supply and demand, given the prices prevailing in forward markets.  If the price move to change the investment comes too late, the price moves could be large and disruptive. 

总体来说，除非原油价格发生改变，我们预期石油的过剩将导致2017年某一阶段出现主要的石油短缺，下图显示了我们将从是有的供应和需求里可预期的变化,尤其在现价普遍超过远期价格的市场里。如果石油价格迟迟不动，那么投资就来不及了，最终石油价格可能以更剧烈，更具破坏性的方式运动。

6

Appendix: A Brief History of Oil Investment Cycles  
 附录： 一个原油投资周期的简要历史

Below, we walk through some historical examples of oil cycles to show how oil investment cycles have played out over time, in order to provide some perspective on the current cycle and what we might see going forward.  Each cycle brought online new sources of production and diversified where the world got its oil from. 

为了针对现在的周期以及不久的未来提供部分见解，以下我们将简述几个历史原油周期的实例以展示长期来说原油投资周期是如何运作的。每个周期都会为产能带来新资源同时将持续分散化世界原油的供应来源。

There have been four major investment cycles in the oil market, where high prices have incentivized investment that eventually unlocked new sources of supply.  Indeed, in the same way that high oil prices have unlocked unconventional oil sources in the most recent boom, crude oil production was initially developed as an alternative lighting fuel to whale oil, the dominant source of the day, whose price escalated as the result of decades of overfishing.  Each oil boom brought on new supply to the market, either from the discovery of new fields or from tapping known fields that previously weren’t economically or technologically feasible.   

在原油市场中有四个主要的投资周期，当高昂的石油价格被投资热潮所催生出来，这将形成新的供应。确实，这和高昂的石油价格以及石油投资热潮中，高油价总是催使非传统的，更便宜的石油资源被开采出来一致，而石油当初是为了代替鲸油而成为照明燃料的，最终成为了今天统治一切的能源。而鲸油的价格也随着逐渐的过度捞捕而水涨船高。每一个石油的繁荣都会促使新的石油供应被引入到市场中，不论是对新领域的勘探或是开发先前被认为没有太多增长空间或是可被开发的油田。

• The first real investment cycle in oil occurred in the 1910s, as the automobile age ushered in a new source of demand for oil.  The surge in demand was dramatic—US motor vehicle registrations rose from 0.1 vehicles per 1,000 residents in 1900 to 87 by 1920—and oil prices rose with it, doubling in real terms over the course of the decade.  This dynamic incentivized a wave of investment that unlocked new fields in Texas, Oklahoma, California, and Louisiana.  All this supply came online at the same time that the Great Depression was hitting demand, and prices fell by more than 70% in the early 1930s. 

 第一个真实的原油投资周期在1910年开始，当汽车时代催促着石油的需求。这样需求的增长是巨大的，美国的汽车等级从1900年的每1000名公民中有0.1辆汽车到1920年的87名-同时石油的价格也在不断增长，在这段时期增长了近2倍，而随之而来的就是投资的热潮以及德克萨斯，俄克拉何马州，加利佛尼亚和路易斯安那油田的开采，所有的这些供应开始同时上线，之后美国经济大萧条开始重创需求，在1930年早期，石油价格跌超70%。

• Demand growth from WWII, in combination with the discovery of the massive East Texas oilfield (the largest in the US), kicked off an investment boom that lasted decades.  During and after WWII, the price of oil was largely government regulated, which limited the degree of overheating and overinvestment.  Starting in WWII, this boom saw the development of new sources of production in the emerging world, in particular the USSR and the Mideast.  During this time, the US share of global production halved, as supply came online from these new regions.  This supply built over time and, in combination with a slowdown in demand growth resulting from the US recession in the early 1960s, pushed the market into surplus.  While the US, led by Texas, moderated production in order to sustain flat nominal pricing, the real price of oil declined by a third in the 1960s.  

自世界第二次世界大战的需求增长后，同时结合发现大规模的东德克萨斯油田（美国最大的油田）这直接引爆了石油投资的狂热。在世界二次大战期间以及二战之后，原油的价格在很大程度上是被政府所主导的，这防止了投资过热和过度投资。在二战开始是，这样的繁荣紧随着发展中国家发现了新资源而来，尤其是苏联和中东，在这一阶段，美国在全球石油的生产量的占比缩减为二分之一，而来自新地区的供应源源不断。这样的供应开始建立，同时伴随着全球需求增长的放缓，最终导致了1960年初美国的经济衰退，而这使得美国产生贸易顺差。当美国，被德克萨斯州所引导的，稳定的石油供应以图稳定石油的价格，真实的油价在1960年减少了近3分之一。

• The OPEC price shocks (in ’72 and ’79), coupled with a flood of liquidity in the wake of the Bretton Woods breakup, led to a boom in investment in novel resources in Alaska, Russia, Latin America, and the North Sea.  However, demand waned in the face of skyrocketing prices, and the market had to work through significant oversupply, with prices falling by 50%.  Higher-cost producers cut investment spending in the face of compressed margins and deteriorating balance sheets, and credit problems emerged in Latin America, where governments had not only pushed to invest in new sources of oil but had taken on foreign borrowing to finance this investment. 

OPEC 产石油价格飙升（1972年以及1979年）是布雷顿森林体系瓦解后，大量流动性紧随着的市场产物。这也同时带来了来自阿拉斯加，俄罗斯，拉丁美洲以及北海的新资源。无论如何，伴随着原油如同火箭一般的价格飙升，需求开始衰退，而原油企业必须通过降价50%以在这样显著的供应过剩市场中生存，更高成本的生产商在通过在投资支出的大幅削减以应对安全边际的挤压以及资产负债表的恶化。拉丁美洲出现信贷问题，最终导致拉美政府只能通过借入大量外债以融资推进开采新的石油渠道。